The investigations relating to Danske Bank's Estonian branch

The conclusions of the investigations into Danske Bank’s Estonia branch initiated in the autumn of 2017 were presented on 19 September 2018. It is clear that the problems related to the Estonian branch were much bigger than anticipated when we initiated the investigations. The investigations showed that from 2007 and 2015 reprehensible conditions at our Estonian branch and at Group level allowed Danske Bank’s branch in Estonia to be misused for suspicious transactions, and they also showed that we reacted too late and too slowly.

Read more about the case in the report from the law firm Bruun & Hjejle, in the press release of 19 September, and here on this site, where you also can read about the measures we are taking to prevent something similar from happening again.

Read the report

Danske Bank's effort to combat financial crime

Over the last years, Danske Bank has made substantial investments to improve our systems and competences to fight financial crime. These efforts will remain at the top of our agenda in the years to come as the methods of those who attempt to misuse the financial system continue to evolve and become more sophisticated.

Unfortunately, we cannot guarantee that suspicious transactions will not take place. Each day, we do what we can to make it as difficult as possible to use Danske Bank for financial crime, including money laundering, and it has never been harder than it is today.

It is a key priority for us to strengthen and improve our efforts on an ongoing basis – and cooperate closely with authorities and others to achieve as strong a defence as possible against the criminal networks.

Our efforts are based on the following key initiatives:

  • Reducing risks in Estonia

    Regarding the specific issues in relation to Estonia, we have taken the following initiatives:


    • The portfolio of the non-resident customers in Estonia was closed down in 2015 (a few accounts were closed at the beginning of 2016). As part of our strategy, we will serve only subsidiaries of our Nordic customers and international customers with a solid Nordic footprint.
    • Governance and oversight in relation to the Baltics have been strengthened with the introduction of a new pan-Baltic management. 
    • The independence of control functions in the Baltics has been strengthened, and processes and controls have been raised to Group level to ensure the same level of risk management and control as in other parts of the Group.
    • The Baltic units have been migrated to a single shared IT platform, which enables increased transparency and oversight.
  • A strong compliance culture and development of competencies
    • Implementation of an AML centre means more efficient workflows and better opportunities to develop specialist competencies. 
    • Expansion of the internal training in anti-money laundering. During the last year alone, approximately 20,000 employees have participated in AML e-learning.
    • Nurture a strong compliance culture where compliance is not just a matter of rules and policies but is about conducting business with high ethical standards and acknowledging the impact on and responsibilities to society.
    • Information to all employees about our whistleblower system on an ongoing basis and yearly mandatory training that explains the system and how the bank protects employees who use it.
    • Implemented risk management and compliance in performance agreements of all members of the Executive Board and relevant senior managers.
  • Investments into more employees and new IT systems
    • Since 2015, the  number of employees working to combat financial crime and money laundering has quadrupled, with the number now totalling more than 1,200. 
    • Investments in IT systems for automated monitoring of bank transfers in order to better detect suspicious transactions. 
    • Over the past year, 170,000 alarms were registered regarding unusual customer behaviour, and over the past year alone, more than 10,000 reports have been sent to the authorities regarding suspicious matters.
  • Strengthened organisation and updated procedures
    • Our Chief Compliance Officer is a member of the Executive Board and refers directly to our CEO.
    • Transfer of the responsibility for processing all reports from whistleblowers to the Group’s compliance unit to strengthen the handling of the reports.
    • Better independent quality-control procedures when collecting required information from new customers, as well as stronger processes for reviewing the money-laundering risk associated with individual customers.
    • New initiatives and procedures to ensure that indications of potentially problematic issues are sufficiently investigated, escalated in a timely manner and effectively handled.
    • In the process of establishing a central Regulatory Supervisory Management Unit at Group level to ensure transparency and completeness in the bank’s interaction with the supervisory authorities and duly, timely and qualified reporting. 

Frequently asked questions 

  • What are the facts of the case and the investigations?

    Until the end of 2015, Danske Bank had a portfolio of foreign customers in Estonia. These were so-called non-residents – that is, customers not residing in or conducting business from Estonia. For a large number of these customers, it was possible during the period from 2007 to 2015 to use Danske Bank’s branch in Estonia for suspicious payments, and according to the investigations led by Bruun & Hjejle, many of them appear to have been suspicious customers. 

    In other words, we had a large number of customers that should never have been customers with us and they made payments that should never have been made. 

    This took place because the Estonian branch had insufficient focus on compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) rules, that the branch operated too independently of the rest of the Group (it had its own IT platform, for example), and there were major deficiencies in the branch’s control systems and monitoring. At the same time, we also suspect that employees in Estonia actively participated in suspicious activities or colluded with customers. 

    The investigations have also shown that a number of the Group’s controls did not work properly in relation to Estonia. The Group did not take action at group level until problems were observed in 2014 in Estonia. Among other things, we responded to a report submitted by a whistleblower and following new investigations from Group Internal Audit. 

    However, it is clear today that our response was inadequate and too slow. There was a lack of understanding of the extent of the risk associated with running the business we had in Estonia, and at Group level, there was generally not sufficient focus on what went on at the Estonian branch.

    Danske Bank has clearly failed to live up to its responsibility in this matter. This is disappointing and unacceptable and we offer our apologies to all of our stakeholders – not least our customers, investors, employees and society in general.

  • What are your comments on the findings of the investigations?

    Danske Bank has clearly failed to live up to its responsibility in this matter. This is disappointing and unacceptable and we offer our apologies to all of our stakeholders – not least our customers, investors, employees and society in general.

    There is no doubt that the problems related to the Estonian branch were much bigger than anticipated when we initiated the investigations. The findings of the investigations point to some very unacceptable and unpleasant matters at our Estonian branch, and they also point to the fact that a number of controls at group level were inadequate in relation to Estonia.

    It is important to us that we uncover what took place and use that as a basis for continued learning and improvement in relation to our efforts to combat money laundering and financial crime.

  • How much money was laundered through your branch in Estonia?

    Our job is to identify suspicious customers and report their payments to the authorities. It is difficult for us to determine whether the money was obtained illegally. The authorities are in a position to collect more information, and it is up to them to assess the extent of money laundering.

  • Why can you not provide an estimate of the amount of suspicious transactions?

    The investigation covers some 15,000 customers with a total of 9.5 million transactions between them. 

    When we presented the investigations in September 2018, we had examined the 6,200 customers found to have hit the most risk indicators as part of the portfolio investigation. Of these, the vast majority have been reported to the authorities. 

    The investigation will establish the total number of suspicious customers but does not establish if all or just some transactions of said customers are suspicious. An investigation into that could not possibly be completed within any reasonable time frame. 

    Therefore, as with similar investigations in other banks, it is difficult to provide an accurate estimate of the amount of suspicious transactions.

    We are continuing to examine the remaining part of the portfolio and report to relevant authorities on an ongoing basis.

  • How could you not discover that such large amounts were changing hands?

    There is no doubt that we should have detected the problems at a much earlier stage. According to the investigators, there was never a proper overview of what took place at the Estonian branch. We overlooked the suspicious activities because we did not focus enough on and knew too little about that part of the business and the risk associated with it.

    Large transaction volumes are not necessarily a problem in themselves if AML procedures are in place. And in that respect, Danske Bank’s management in Copenhagen had the wrong impression that allowance had been made for the large risks associated with the portfolio. Furthermore, the Estonian branch was using its own IT systems, which impeded the Group’s insight into and control of the transactions. The total number of transactions has taken us by surprise.

    There are also indications that one or more employees at the Estonian branch have tried to conceal what was going on or have in some way taken part in suspicious activities. On the basis of the investigation, we have found reason to report 42 employees to the Estonian authorities, of which eight have been reported directly to the police.

  • Who was in charge of the investigations - and do you think they are impartial?

    The investigations were overseen by Danske Bank’s Board of Directors. The law firm of Bruun & Hjejle managed and supervised the investigations and was also responsible for preparing the final report. In concert with the Group’s Compliance Incident Management team, a number of external consultancies contributed research and data analysis. All parties reported to Bruun & Hjejle.

    The Board of Directors has been very keen to ensure that the investigations were objective and thorough. The law firm of Bruun & Hjejle has led the investigations with a view to ensuring that the information collected, reviewed and assessed during the process provides a sufficient and appropriate basis for finding the investigations objective and thorough.

    We launched the investigations also to get to the bottom of what happened at the Estonian branch and to understand why it was not detected and stopped at an earlier stage. And thus to be able to take the necessary action. It was never our intention for the investigations to replace investigations carried out by authorities. As the investigations progressed, we have shared relevant information with the authorities.


  • Which authorities are investigating the issue?

    We are in dialogue with American authorities and Danish and Estonian authorities have publicly announced that they are investigating the issue. Most recently, on 28 November 2018, we received a preliminary charge in the case from the Danish State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SØIK).

    It is only natural that authorities are investigating this issue, and we strive to engage in good and constructive dialogue with the relevant authorities.

  • What is the amount of potential fines?

    We do not want to speculate about that. We have kept relevant authorities updated and will share relevant findings with them. The authorities alone will decide on whether we will be fined and if so, how much. 

    Danske Bank is a very well-capitalised bank, and we thus have a very solid position to absorb any fines imposed on us as a result of the case.

  • How much of your earnings in Estonia will you waive?

    The Board of Directors has decided to donate the gross income from the customers in the period from 2007 to 2015, which is estimated at DKK 1.5 billion as the bank is not able to provide an accurate estimate of the amount of suspicious transactions made by non-resident customers in Estonia during the period.

    To the extent it is not confiscated by the authorities, the gross earnings will be transferred to an independent foundation, which will be set up to support initiatives aimed at combating international financial crime, including money laundering, including in Denmark and Estonia. The foundation will be set up independently from Danske Bank with an independent board.

    Unlike confiscation, any potential fine will not affect the amount of the donation.

  • Who is accountable?

    The investigation concludes that errors and shortcomings at group level and at the Estonian branch made it possible to use Danske Bank’s branch in Estonia for suspicious transactions. 

    When it comes to individual accountability, it has been established that a number of former and current employees, both at the Estonian branch and at Group level, have not complied with the legal obligations forming part of their employment with Danske Bank. The investigation into accountability has established that the Board of Directors, the Chairman and the CEO did not breach their legal obligations towards Danske Bank. 

    Danske Bank’s former CEO, Thomas F. Borgen, resigned as a result of the case, however, and the chairman of the Board of Directors will step down at an extraordinary general meeting to be held on 7 December 2018.

    As part of the investigations, the Board of Directors, Executive Board members and a large number of senior managers have been assessed by the Bruun & Hjejle law firm. The assessments have given rise to varying degrees of serious criticism of a number of individuals in Estonia and Denmark. 

    On the basis of the investigations, we have taken a number of measures. For a number of employees in Estonia, we have had to report suspicious behaviour to the authorities, just as we have reported eight of these employees to the police. 

  • What consequences will the conclusions of the investigations have for the persons responsible?

    On the Board of Directors, we have been very clear in saying that we would take any consequences necessary as a result of the case and launch initiatives to the extent that this has not already been done. On the basis of the investigations, we have taken a number of measures. First and foremost, they concern the employees who have not lived up to their responsibility or have been grossly negligent in the performance of their duties. By far most of those employees are no longer employed with Danske Bank, and for a number of employees in Estonia, suspicious behaviour has been reported to the authorities, just as eight of these employees have been reported to the police. There may also be consequences – also retroactively – for the variable pay of a number of senior managers and members of the Executive Board subject to criticism, who have participated in bonus schemes.

  • Who are the money launderers?

    We are obliged not to publish information that can identify specific customers or employees but the investigation concludes that a large proportion of customers in the non-resident portfolio has been suspicious.

    These customers have been reported to the authorities, and it is now up to them to investigate if there have been acts of money laundering or any other form of financial crime, and - if so - who is behind it.

  • Can you guarantee that something like this will not happen again?

    First and foremost, it important to state that we will probably never completely eradicate money laundering. The banking community is doing a great deal, but the criminals and the networks that they are part of are becoming more and more sophisticated and are always trying to circumvent our systems and controls.

    Today, the situation is different when it comes to the combating of money laundering than it was when the case developed in Estonia. We have rectified the situation in Estonia and have ensured, among other things, that the portfolio in question was closed down. Also, we decided – and this applies in all three Baltic countries – to focus only on Nordic customers and global customers with a solid Nordic footprint. Governance and oversight in relation to the Baltic units have been strengthened, for example with the introduction of a new pan-Baltic management. In addition, the independence of local control functions has been strengthened to ensure the same level of control as in other parts of the Group. 

    We have strengthened our efforts to combat financial crime, including money laundering significantly and have invested considerably in improving all three lines of defence (business, compliance and audit). Thus, more than 1,200 employees now work in this area.

    We have initiated a comprehensive AML programme, which has led to new organisational structures, new routines and procedures, We have also implemented new and shared IT systems in the Baltic countries, which ensure better integration with the rest of the Group and a higher degree of transparency and control.

    We continue to strengthen the compliance knowledge and culture across our organisation. 

    Over the past 12 months, our 20,000 employees have spent a total of 46,000 hours on 63 e-learning modules dealing, among other things, with preventing financial crime, including money laundering.

    Last, but not least, we invest in automating business procedures and upgrading the IT systems that support those procedures. We are also improving the “know-your-customer” procedures used when welcoming new customers to Danske Bank. This gives us a far better overview and better monitoring of our customer’s activities.


  • Have you had similar issues elsewhere?

    As a natural consequence of this case, we are also looking into other parts of our business, including Latvia and Lithuania. We have not had the same type of business with the same type of portfolio in these countries and have no reason to believe that something similar has happened there, but we are of course looking into it.

  • How does this affect me as a customer?

    This will in no way affect your day-to-day business with us. This case will not affect our general ambition to operate a bank that is competitive for our customers.

    If you have questions regarding the case, you are of course always welcome to contact your adviser or your local branch.

     

  • Have you attempted to prevent the whistleblower from speaking with theauthorities?

    No employees of Danske Bank are contractually prevented from going to the police or other relevant authority if they have information about illegal circumstances. In the matter in question, we have said that we encourage anyone who has anything to contribute to pass their knowledge on to the authorities.

    As we have stated earlier, we will not stand in the way if a whistleblower participates in the public debate, including, for example, taking part in any public enquiries to the extent applicable legislation permits so. The whistleblower in the Estonia case has previously received a legal notification from us in which we gave our consent for the individual concerned to talk to the relevant supervisory authorities in Denmark and Estonia, among other countries, and in this connection, we have encouraged the individual concerned to do so. We have released the individual from all contractual stipulations regarding the duty of confidentiality . 

    It is not possible for us to do more than this. We cannot lift the statutory restrictions to which a whistleblower – like all others – is subject, e.g. duty of confidentiality in relation to customer information.

  • Why did Danske Bank participate in the public hearings of the Danish parliament and the EU parliament on 19 and 21 November, respectively?

    We fully understand that politicians in both Denmark and at EU level are critical of Danske Bank in connection with the Estonia case, and it is only natural that they show great interest in the money laundering topic more generally. For this reason, we are happy to participate so that we can provide politicians with answers to the questions that they may have. We see these hearings as part of our efforts to rebuild trust in the bank.

  • Can you comment on the preliminary charge brought by SØIK on 28 November 2018?

    It is in our interest that the case is fully investigated, and we will, of course, cooperate with SØIK and make ourselves and the knowledge we have available in relation to the ongoing investigation. In recent years, we have taken a number of initiatives, and the situation is now quite different from what it was at the time of the suspicious transactions in Estonia. We will continue to give high priority to this area.

    In the short term, the preliminary charge will not have much effect. It is a natural step in the police investigation, and we did not think that our own investigation, the results of which were announced in September, would be the only investigation made.

    It is still too early to say whether we will eventually be charged and what a possible penalty could be.

Recording of the press conference about the findings of the investigations

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Investigation method

The investigations have been very thorough and extensive. The scope of the investigations covers approximately 15,000 customers and 9.5 million payments in the period 2007-2015. Some 12,000 documents and more than 8 million emails have been searched, and more than 70 interviews have been conducted with current and former employees and managers, including members of the Executive Board and members of the Board of Directors. Overall, approximately 70 people have worked full time on the investigations.
  • Led by the law firm Bruun & Hjejle

    The investigations have been anchored in the Board of Directors and led by the external law firm Bruun & Hjejle in order to ensure that the information collected, reviewed and assessed during the investigations provides a sufficient basis for finding the investigations objective and thorough. The investigators were given a full mandate to investigate anything and everyone they have found relevant.

    Generally, the investigations focus on two separate things:

    • A thorough examination of customers and transactions at the Estonian branch in the period from 2007 to 2015
    • An examination of who knew what and when, both in Estonia and at Group level, and to determine whether managers and employees lived up to their responsibilities to a sufficient degree
  • Investigation of customers and transactions

    The investigation of customers and transactions in Estonia from 2007 to 2015 was conducted by Danske Bank’s Compliance Incident Management Team, headed by Jens Madsen, former head of Denmark’s intelligence agency and the Fraud Squad (PET and SØIK).

    On an ongoing basis, the findings of the investigations have been passed on directly to Bruun & Hjejle, which has led the team and expanded the investigation when deemed relevant.

    The investigation covered a total of 15,000 customers and 9.5 million payments during the nine-year period.

    The investigation was conducted in cooperation Danish and international experts: the consultancy firms PwC and EY, the data analysis software company Palantir Technologies and the company CERTA Intelligence & Security.

  • Investigation of managers and employee responsibility

    Bruun & Hjejle has examined around 12,000 documents and more than 8 million emails to establish a timeline, which details, as thoroughly as possible, which employees and managers knew what and when.

    In addition, more than 70 interviews were conducted with current and former employees and managers, including members of the Executive Board and members of the Board of Directors.

    The investigation was conducted in cooperation with the consultancy firm Promontory.

Facts - what is money laundering

“To launder money” is a term used to describe the practices employed to make illegally gained money seem as if it has been earned by legal means.

Criminal activities such as drug trafficking, fraud or tax evasion can generate substantial profits. Money laundering is a way for the perpetrators to control these funds without attracting attention to the underlying activities or the persons involved.

It is estimated that up to USD 2,000 billion is laundered globally every year (according to UN Office on Drug and Crime).

Various schemes, which often involve companies, straw men or complex transactions made through the financial systems, are designed to hide the source of the money.

What do banks do to prevent money laundering?
Banks play an important role in combating money laundering. In order to live up to this responsibility, banks and other financial institutions have to put in place a financial crime set-up that will enable them to identify and report on suspicious behaviour.

It is up to the authorities to determine if money laundering is taking place and to decide on the appropriate action.

The authorities receive thousands of reports of suspicious activities from banks each year. Over the past year alone, Danske Bank, for example, sent more than 10,000 reports to Financial Investigation Units in various countries.

Timeline

 

2007-2012

In February 2007, Danske Bank acquires Finnish-based Sampo Bank, including the Estonian subsidiary Sampo Pank.

The later-to-be Danske Bank’s branch in Estonia had a portfolio of foreign customers known as non-residents. These are customers not residing in or conducting business from Estonia.

 

2013

In April-May, Danske Bank submits incorrect information to the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (the Danish FSA) about control functions and AML procedures at the Estonian branch.

During the summer, international banks express concerns in relation to the portfolio because they have misgivings about AML.

This results in a review of the non-resident business, and certain customer relationships are terminated.

In December 2013, a whistleblower submits the first report on problems at the Estonian branch and in relation to the non-resident portfolio. Later, the whistleblower points to several others problems.

 

2014

At the beginning of 2014, Danske Bank conducts an internal investigation into conditions at the Estonian branch. A work group is appointed, and Group Internal Audit prepares several reports.

At the same time, an external consultancy firm reviews the AML procedures at the Estonian branch. Their report points out a number of material and critical inadequacies of the AML procedures.

It is during this process that the Group becomes aware that the AML setup in relation to the non-resident portfolio at the Estonian branch is clearly inadequate and insufficient.

In September 2014, the Estonian FSA sends its draft of a highly critical inspection report to Danske Bank. The final – and still highly critical – report is completed in December 2014.

 

2015-2016

In January 2015, the Board of Directors decides to terminate the non-resident portfolio completely and to revise the strategy for the Estonian branch. This is on a recommendation issued by the Executive Board in October 2014.

The Danish FSA conducts an inspection visit in February 2015. In March 2016, Danske Bank receives, among other things, a reprimand for not having identified material money laundering risks or taken risk-mitigating measures at the branch in Estonia.

In July, the Estonian FSA issues an order to the Estonian branch on the basis of the report from December 2014.

The cooperation with international banks in Estonia is terminated during the summer.

The termination of relationships with customers in the non-resident portfolio is accelerated in the second half of 2015 and is completed in January 2016.

 

March 2017

Several media run articles about Russian money laundering, and Danske Bank decides to conduct a root cause analysis of the suspicious transactions in the now closed-down non-resident portfolio. The analysis concludes that the lack of control is due to inadequate focus on the combating of money laundering in Estonia, a lack of focus on governance in relation to compliance and risk, and management follow-up being highly dependent on local country management. The analysis is conducted by the Promontory Financial Group consultancy firm.

 

Sep-Nov 2017

The investigations are expanded to include two separate things: A thorough investigation into customers and transactions in Estonia in the period from 2007 to 2015, including whether employees have, actively or otherwise, contributed to suspicious transactions; and an investigation into who knew what and when, both in Estonia and at Group level. Both investigations are overseen by the Board of Directors and led and supervised by external law firms in cooperation with international experts.

 

April-May 2018

Lars Mørch, Member of the Executive Board, resigns from his position. The investigation into matters relating to the Estonian non-resident portfolio has not been completed, but it is clear that Danske Bank should have launched more thorough investigations at an earlier time than we did, as this would have provided an understanding of the extent of the problems, in turn leading to swifter action.

The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority announces its decision in the case.

 

July 2018

Danske Bank announces that it does not want to benefit financially from suspicious transactions that took place in Estonia and intends to make the income from such transactions available for the benefit of society, for example to combat financial crime.

 

July-Aug 2018

Estonia’s general prosecutor begins investigating Danske Bank’s Estonian branch for possible breach of law.

The Danish Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SØIK) announces that it has launched an investigation of Danske Bank regarding possible violation of anti-money laundering legislation.

 

September 2018

The findings and conclusions of Danske Bank’s own, externally led, investigations are presented.

Thomas F. Borgen resigns as CEO of Danske Bank.

Danske Bank receives requests for information from US authorities in connection with their investigation of the case.

 

October 2018

Jesper Nielsen, Head of Banking Denmark, is appointed acting CEO of Danske Bank.

 

November 2018

Jesper Nielsen, acting CEO of Danske Bank, represents Danske Bank at public hearings about money laundering and financial crime in the Danish parliament on 19 November 2018 and the EU parliament on 21 November.

28 November: The Danish State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SØIK) brings a preliminary charge against Danske Bank for violation of the Danish Anti-Money Laundering Act in the case relating to the Estonian branch.

 

December 2018

Chairman of the Board of Directors Ole Andersen steps down at an extraordinary general meeting. Karsten Dybvad is appointed as new chairman of the Board of Directors.

2007-2012
2013
2014
2015-2016
March 2017
Sep-Nov 2017
April-May 2018
July 2018
July-Aug 2018
September 2018
October 2018
November 2018
December 2018

Read more

Here are the releases and announcements previously issued in relation to the case.

7 December 2018: Extraordinary general meeting of Danske Bank 2018

28 November 2018: Danske Bank preliminarily charged by SØIK with violating the Danish Anti-Money Laundering Act in the case relating to the Estonian branch

19 November 2018: Jesper Nielsen participates in money laundering hearings   

14 November 2018: Extraordinary general meeting in Danske Bank A/S 

6 November 2018: Request to convene an extraordinary general meeting to change the Board of Directors   
1 November 2018: Continued growth in lending, lower trading income and donation regarding Estonia 

17 October 2018: Update regarding appointment of new chief executive   

4 October 2018: Danske Bank is in dialogue with the US authorities regarding the Estonia case 
 
4 October 2018: Danske Bank ordered to reassess its solvency need Share buy-back programme for 2018 is discontinued 

1 October 2018: Danske Bank appoints interim CEO   

19 September 2018: Findings of the investigations relating to Danske Bank's branch in Estonia

19 September 2018: Danske Bank's CEO resigns

19 September 2018: Danske Bank A/S donates DKK 1.5 billion and revises outlook downwards

3 May 2018: Decision from the Danish FSA regarding Danske Bank’s management and governance in relation to the matter concerning its branch in Estonia

5 April 2018: Lars Mørch resigns from Danske Bank

13 March 2018: Comments on the AML case by Ole Andersen, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Danske Bank

25 January 2018: Danske Bank no longer placed under AML investigation in France

11 October 2017: Danske Bank placed under AML investigation in France

21 September 2017: Danske Bank expands investigation of Estonia branch

5 September 2017: Comments on media coverage of transactions at Danske Bank in Estonia

20 March 2017: Comments on media coverage of transactions at Danske Bank in connection with money laundering case